We describe a method of forcing against weak theories of arithmetic and its applications in propositional proof complexity.
Introduction
We are interested in the following problem. Given a nonstandard model M of arithmetic we want to expand it by interpreting a binary relation symbol R such that R M does something prohibitive, e.g. violates the pigeonhole principle in the sense that R M is a bijection from n + 1 onto n for some (nonstandard) n ∈ M. The goal is to do so while preserving as much as possible from ordinary arithmetic. More precisely, we want the expansion (M, R M ) to model the least number principle for a class of formulas as large as possible.
Progress concerning this general problem has been very slow. Concerning the pigeonhole principle, the central results are the following. Paris and Wilkie [30] succeeded in getting the least number principle for existential formulas, and Riis [38] pushed their line of argument to handle formulas that may additionally have universal quantifiers bounded by some b 0 < n o(1) , i.e. n raised to some infinitesimal power. The most important result in the area is due to Ajtai [1] , who could do it for formulas with quantifiers (of both types) bounded by some b 0 that is bigger than any standard power of n. Subsequent work [31, 27 ] improved Ajtai's bound to b 0 < 2 n o(1) , which is essentially optimal. The purpose of this article is to give a common framework for constructing such expansions by forcing.
Independence and proof complexity The main motivation for our question is a better understanding of independence from (weak) theories of arithmetic. Pudlák argues that the current understanding is unsatisfactory in that "except for Gödel's theorem which gives only special formulas, no general method is known to prove independence of [arithmetical] Π 1 sentences" [33, section 3] . The question is linked to central open questions in computational complexity theory in general and propositional proof complexity in particular.
In fact, already weak arithmetical theories like those in Buss' hierarchy correspond in a certain precise sense to the complexity classes in the polynomial hierarchy. In this respect, Riis' result implies independence of the pigeonhole principle from Buss' theory T 1 2 (R), Ajtai's result implies independence from the theory I∆ 0 (R), and the mentioned improvements imply independence from Buss' T 2 (R).
1
Independence from weak arithmetics is closely related to lower bounds on the size of propositional proofs. The usual textbook systems, i.e. Hilbert style calculi given by finitely many inference rules, are usually called Frege systems [14] . For these systems no superpolynomial lower bounds on proof size are known 2 (see [11] for a survey), in particular, there are short (polynomial size) Frege proofs of a sequence of tautologies expressing the pigeonhole principle [9] . Ajtai's result implies a superpolynomial lower bound n ω(1) for bounded depth Frege proofs, i.e. Frege proofs using only formulas of some fixed ∧/∨-alternation rank. The mentioned improvements of Ajtai's result imply an exponential lower bound 2
n Ω(1) . Riis' result implies an n Ω(1) lower bound on a general notion of width, namely Poizat width, of refutations of arbitrary infinity axioms in arbitrary proof systems. We refer to section 5 for details.
Paris and Wilkie, Riis, and Ajtai all explicitly refer to their argument as being of the forcing type. Ajtai says his construction of R M is "done according to the general ideas of Cohen's method of forcing " [1, p.348] . However, the argument is "mostly combinatorial and probabilistic" [1, p.347] , relying on specialized and difficult versions of so-called switching lemmas in circuit complexity. As Ben-Sasson and Harsha put it, it is "extremely difficult to understand and explain" [7, p.19:2] . Lots of efforts have been made to simplify and reinterpret Ajtai's argument (e.g. [6, 34, 23, 24, 25, 7] ). Conceptually, later improvements [6, 31, 27 ] of Ajtai's result "eliminate the non-standard model theory" [6, p.367 ] and the forcing mode of speech. And technically, the mentioned switching lemmas have been improved and simplified (see [4, 48] for surveys).
Still, not much is known on how to apply Ajtai's argument to stronger systems or other principles (cf. [23, Chapter 12] ). Perhaps one can say that the abovementioned efforts did not lead to an understanding of Ajtai's argument as instantiating some general method as Pudlák asks for.
Comparison with Cohen forcing This sorry state of affairs clearly contrasts with Cohen forcing in set theory. We recall briefly and informally its set-up. With a model M of ZF and a 'generic' set G external to M one associates a model M[G] containing G. Intuitively, G being 'generic' means being 'random' with respect to possible partial information about it. Forcing is a way to reason about M[G] using partial information about G. A piece of partial information p forces ϕ if any generic G 'satisfying' p leads to a model M[G] satisfying ϕ. Such pieces can be extended in various, possibly incompatible ways, so we think of them as being partially ordered (the forcing frame).
Following Shoenfield [43] , reasoning about forcing rests on three central lemmas: the Extension Lemma states that extension preserves forcing, the Truth Lemma asserts that every sentence true in M[G] is already forced by some partial information p about G, and the Definability Lemma states that the forcing relation is in a certain sense definable in M. In turn, these lemmas rest on the Forcing Completeness Theorem, a characterization of the 'semantic' forcing notion above by a handier 'syntactic' notion defined via recursion on logical syntax. This understanding of forcing underlies the "Principal Theorem" [43] stating that M[G] models ZF. This way an independence question is reduced to a combinatorial task of designing an appropriate forcing frame.
In contrast, the mentioned forcing type arguments in bounded arithmetic are not based on some more general background theory of forcing. Ajtai writes "Our terminology will be similar to the terminology of forcing but we actually do not use any result from it" [1, p.348 ]. Consequently it is not completely clear why one should refer to these arguments as forcing arguments. Technically, the crucial difference is that the Definability Lemma fails. Forcing Completeness is proved neither in the original arguments nor in later presentations [51] , [23, section 12.7] that emphasize the forcing mode of speech. In [30, 1] no 'syntactic' notion is defined; in [38] it is, but one for which Forcing Completeness fails.
This work We propose a general background theory of forcing as a unifying way to address the problem mentioned in the beginning and to understand the arguments of Paris and Wilkie, Riis, and Ajtai [30, 38, 1] . We first sketch the argument of Paris and Wilkie and discuss what such a theory should look like. Section 2 then develops forcing accordingly. The framework naturally accommodates the mentioned forcing arguments [30, 38, 1] as well as Cohen forcing and others.
In our context, a Principal Theorem would state that generic expansions satisfy the least number principle for a certain fragment of formulas. In section 3 we show that this holds true when using a forcing that is in an appropriate sense 'definable' for the fragment in question. A more combinatorial formulation of this property is gained by what we call the antichain method. Thereby again, independence questions reduce to a combinatorial task of designing forcing frames.
Section 4 gives the constructions of Paris and Wilkie, Riis and Ajtai within this framework. As a byproduct we obtain the above mentioned 'width' lower bound in section 5.
The framework proposed allows to understand Ajtai's result as instantiating some general method closely following Cohen forcing. In [26] Krajíček also developes such a framework which is technically and conceptually quite different, and follows Scott and Solovay's forcing with random variables. This and other related work is discussed in Notes at the end of sections 2, 4 and 5. All results are stated and proved in a generally accessible language. In particular, no familiarity with bounded arithmetic or forcing is assumed. This way we hope to bring some open questions in the field to the attention of a wider audience. In particular, techniques from set theoretic forcing may be applicable to these questions.
Forcing in general 2.1 Motivation
To start, we sketch the argument of Paris and Wilkie [30] , "the first forcing argument in the context of weak arithmetic" [23, p.278] , and give some informal discussion.
Theorem 2.1 (Paris, Wilkie 1985) . Let M be a countable model of true arithmetic and
satisfies the least number principle for existential formulas with parameters.
Being a model of true arithmetic means being elementarily equivalent to the standard model N interpreting, say, the language L := {+, · , 0, 1, <}. We write [n] for {m ∈ M | m < M n}. That (M, R M ) satisfies the least number principle for a formula ϕ(x) means that the set ϕ(M) defined by ϕ(x) in (M, R M ) is empty or has a minimal element (with respect to the linear order < M ). That ϕ(x) is a formula with parameters means that its language is L ∪ {R} together with the elements of M as constant symbols which are understood to be interpreted by themselves.
Proof sketch. That n is nonstandard means that [n] is infinite. Consider the set P of finite partial bijections from [n + 1] to [n] . We construct an interpretation R M of R as the union of a chain ∅ = p 0 ⊆ p 1 ⊆ · · · in P . Having constructed p 2i we choose p 2i+1 such that it contains the ith element a of [n + 1] in its domain and the ith element b of [n] in its image; here, we are refering to fixed, external enumerations of [n + 1] and [n]. These choices ensure that R M = i∈N p i will be a bijection from [n + 1] onto [n] . In fact, p 2i+1 'forces' that the expansion under construction will satisfy ∃!yRay and ∃!xRxb.
Fix an enumeration of all existential (L ∪ {R})-formulas with parameters. The choice of p 2i+2 'forces' that the ith such formula ϕ(x) will not violate the least number principle. This is done as follows: write ϕ(x) = ∃ȳψ(x,ȳ) and let a ∈ M. Assume p 2i+1 is such that ¬ϕ(a) is not 'forced', i.e. some continuation of the chain leads to an
is quantifier free it is propositionally satisfied by the truth values of the atoms Rcd occuring in it -say these are ℓ ∈ N many. Then there is q ∈ P containing ℓ pairs such that p 2i+1 ∪ q is in P and 'forces' ψ(b, a) and thereby ϕ(a). Now, it is not hard to see that there is an L-formula χ(x) with parameters that expresses this as a property of a in M. If there is no a satisfying χ(x) in M, then take p 2i+2 = p 2i+1 . Otherwise there is a minimal such a, because M is a model of true arithmetic, and then take p 2i+2 = p 2i+1 ∪ q for the corresponding q.
What is the general line of this argument, that justifies calling it "a simple forcing argument"? [30, p.333 ] Intuitively, P figures as 'forcing frame' and p ∈ P 'forces' a sentence ϕ if ϕ is true in all those expansions (M, R M ) that result from continuing the construction of the chain from p. The construction is done as it is in order to 'force' certain properties of R M . For the right notion of genericity, this should be automatic. This way one can define a 'semantic' notion of forcing by stipulating that p 'forces' ϕ if ϕ is true in all 'generic' expansions (M, R M ). Note P can be viewed as a subset of M when identifying the finite partial bijections with their codes in M, but this set is not definable in M. We thus ask for some general framework for forcing with undefinable forcing frames P . In fact, we let P be just a second structure. We start with syntactically defined forcing relations in section 2.3. It is a subtle point to come up with the right notion of genericity, a point discussed in section 2.4. Section 2.5 then defines generic associates M[G] of M. Generic expansions are obtained using a simple type of forcing that we call conservative (section 2.6).
The resulting framework includes the Extension Lemma, the Truth Lemma and Forcing Completeness but of course no Definability Lemma. It is sufficiently general to naturally accomodate various forcing type arguments from the literature (cf. section 2.7), including Cohen forcing and, as we shall see in section 4, the mentioned forcing type arguments in bounded arithmetic.
Basic forcing terminology
A forcing frame is a structure (P, ≤, D 0 , D 1 , . . .) such that ≤ partially orders P and D 0 , D 1 , . . . are subsets of P . We use p, q, r, . . . to range over elements of P , called conditions. If p ≤ q we say p extends q and call p an extension of q. If p, q have a common extension, they are compatible (p q) and otherwise incompatible (p⊥q).
A set of conditions X ⊆ P is downward-closed if it contains all extensions of its elements; being upward-closed is similarly explained. The set X is consistent if it contains a common extension of any two of its elements. If X is both upward-closed and consistent, then it is a filter. Further, X is dense below p if for every q ≤ p there is r ≤ q such that r ∈ X. Finally, X is dense if it is dense below all conditions, i.e. if every condition has an extension in X.
For the rest of the section we fix -a countable forcing frame
The forcing language is L * (M), that is, the language L * together with the elements of M as new constants. We let ϕ, ψ, . . . range over L * (M)-sentences.
Forcing relations
In principle, countless 'syntactic' forcing relations may be defined, depending on how interacts with the logical symbols. Throughout this paper we assume (first-order) formulas to be written in the logical symbols {∀, ∃, ∧, ∨, ¬} and we shall restrict attention to two kinds of forcings, namely, universal and existential forcings. 3 Roughly, the choice depends on whether {∀, ∧, ¬} or {∃, ∨, ¬} is taken as primitive while the other logical symbols are defined using the usual classical dualities. Existential forcing is widely used, but we shall see it has some disadvantages over universal forcing (cf. Remark 2.22). 
Observe that a universal or existential pre-forcing is uniquely determined by its restriction to the atomic sentences of the forcing language. Proof. Extension can be shown by a straightforward induction using forcing recurrence. We prove Stability by induction on (the number of logical symbols in) ϕ. We can assume that ϕ is written in the logical base {∧, ¬, ∀}.
-For atomic ϕ, Stability is part of the definition of being a forcing.
-For the ¬-step, argue indirectly: if p ¬ϕ, then by forcing recurrence some q ≤ p forces ϕ, so by Extension and Consistency no extension of q forces ¬ϕ. Hence [¬ϕ] is not dense below p. . By induction p forces both ϕ and ψ, and hence p (ϕ ∧ ψ) by universal recurrence.
-The ∀-step is similar.
Statement (3) is immediate by (1) and (2), and statement (4) follows from (3): p ϕ if and only if there is q ≤ p such that for all r ≤ q, r ϕ (by (3)), if and only if there is q ≤ p such that q ¬ϕ (by forcing recurrence).
Example 2.7. Let be a universal forcing. A pre-forcing of obvious interest (cf. section 2.1) is: p ϕ if and only if p ¬ϕ, that is, q ϕ for some q ≤ p.
To explain the notation, observe that p ϕ if and only if p q for some q ∈ [ϕ] (by Extension). We have ⊆ by Consistency. By Stability, p ¬¬ϕ if and only if p ϕ. Further,
(as existential pre-forcing) p ∃xχ(x) iff ∃a ∈ M : p χ(a) (as existential pre-forcing) 
Genericity
Let be an existential or universal forcing. Ideally, one would like to call a set generic if it intersects every dense set. As in general such sets do not exist, one has to restrict attention to those dense sets coming from a certain 'sufficiently rich' but countable Boolean algebra B( ).
In Cohen forcing the forcing frame is a set in M and one simply takes the algebra of its M-definable subsets (cf. Example 2.27). As M models ZF it is not surprising that this algebra is sufficiently rich. For some purposes (cf. Examples 2.29, 2.30, 2.23) already the algebra generated by the [ϕ]s is sufficiently rich, but not so in forcing against bounded arithmetic. There, one needs the algebra to contain sets as e.g. a∈M b∈M [ϕ(a, b)]. In [30, 1, 38] algebras are defined ad hoc suitable for their respective situations and there seems to be no canonical choice. That is why we padded the forcing frame by the sets D 0 , D 1 , . . .: these sets will determine an algebra B( ) defined below (Definition 2.11). Definition 2.9. A set G ⊆ P is generic if it is a filter and intersects every dense (in P ) set in B( ).
Our definition of B( ) follows Stern [45] : consider the two-sorted first-order structure (P, M). The first sort carries the forcing frame (P, ≤, D 0 , D 1 , . . .) and a second carries the structure M. We let individual variables µ, ν, ξ, . . . range over the first sort and x, y, z, . . . range over the second sort.
For each L * -atom ϕ = ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x r ) let R ϕ be an (r + 1)-ary relation symbol of sort P × M r . The structure (P, M) expands (P, M) by interpreting such a symbol R ϕ by {pā ∈ P × M r | p ϕ(ā)}. We call the two-sorted first-order language of (P, M) the Stern formalism. Using forcing recurrence it is straightforward to show:
there is a formula ξ ⊢ ϕ(x) of the Stern formalism with free variables ξ andx and parameters from M that defines {pā | p ϕ(ā)} in (P, M) . Definition 2.11. The forcing algebra B( ) is the set of subsets of P that are definable in (P, M) .
Here and in the following, definable (in a certain structure) always means definable with parameters (from the structure).
Clearly, B( ) is countable. Hence, by a well-known argument, Lemma 2.12. Every condition is contained in some generic set.
Proof sketch. Given p ∈ P , let p 0 := p, then choose p 1 ≤ p 0 in the first dense set, then p 2 ≤ p 1 in the second dense set and so on. The filter generated by the sequence p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . is generic.
, a formula (with parameters) of the Stern formalism. By genericity there exists an r ∈ G ∩ D(p). As p ∈ G and G is consistent, r / ∈ {q | p⊥q}, so r ∈ D ∩ {q | q ≤ p}.
Generic associates
Let be a universal or existential forcing. The aim is to define for suitable G ⊆ P (and
in such a way, that it models the following theory in the forcing language L * (M):
Obviously this cannot work in general, e.g. Th(G) may contradict usual first-order equality axioms. But we shall see that this is the only obstacle provided we stick to the idea that the constants from M "name" all the elements of M[G]. We first observe that for generic G, the theory Th(G) is complete and formally consistent in the following sense:
Proof. By Lemmas 2.4 (3) and 2.10, G intersects [ϕ] ∪ [¬ϕ] ∈ B(
). Hence ϕ ∈ Th(G) or ¬ϕ ∈ Th(G) -but not both: assume there would exist p, q ∈ G forcing ϕ and ¬ϕ respectively; since G is a filter and filters are consistent, there would exist r extending both p and q; by Extension, then r would force both ϕ and ¬ϕ, contradicting Consistency (of forcing).
To define M[G]
we rely on some elementary facts about factorizations: for a theory T in a language L containing some constant symbol, the Herbrand term structure T(T ) for T has as universe all closed L-terms, interprets a function symbol f ∈ L byt → f (t) and interprets a relation symbol R ∈ L by {t | Rt ∈ T }. Note that in T(T ) every closed term denotes itself. A congruence ∼ on T(T ) is an equivalence relation on T(T ) such that functions in T(T ) (i.e. interpretations of function symbols of L) map equivalent arguments (i.e. componentwise equivalent argument tuples) to equivalent values and every relation of T(T ) is a union of equivalence classes of tuples. In this case, let T(T )/ ∼ denote the L-structure induced by T(T ) on the ∼-classes in the natural way. In T(T )/∼ every closed term t denotes its ∼-class t/∼.
is a congruence on T(Th(G)) and every closed term of the forcing language is ∼ Th(G) -congruent to a constant a ∈ M, then we say M[G] is defined and set
Remark 2.17. Sometimes we assume that M[G] is defined for every generic G. Because this assumption is trivially satisfied in all applications we are aware of, we consider it a mere technicality and make no efforts to avoid it.
Lemma 2.18. Let G be generic.
We omit the proof.
Theorem 2.19 (Truth Lemma
Proof. We have to show: M[G] |= ϕ if and only if p ϕ for some p ∈ G. We have two cases depending of whether is universal or existential. In both cases we proceed by induction on ϕ.
The case where is existential is easy. The base case follows by construction (Fact 2.15). Both the ∨-step and the ∃-step are trivial. Finally,
, is equivalent to ϕ / ∈ Th(G) by induction and thus to ¬ϕ ∈ Th(G) by Lemma 2.14. The case where is universal is more complicated. The base case and the ¬-step are as in the existential case, and the ∧-step is straightforward using the consistency of G. For the ∀-step, first assume that some p ∈ G forces ∀xϕ(x). Then p ϕ(a) for every a ∈ M by universal recurrence, so
by Lemma 2.18 (2). Conversely, assume ∀xϕ(x) / ∈ Th(G). We aim to show ϕ(a) / ∈ Th(M[G]) for some a ∈ M. By Lemma 2.14, ¬∀xϕ(x) ∈ Th(G), i.e. some p ∈ G forces ¬∀xϕ(x). By universal recurrence this means that for every q ≤ p there is a ∈ M such that q ϕ(a). By Lemma 2.6 (4) this means: for every q ≤ p there is a ∈ M and there is r ≤ q such that r ¬ϕ(a). In other words, D := a∈M [¬ϕ(a)] is dense below p. Clearly, D ∈ B( ): it is defined by ∃x(ξ ⊢ ¬ϕ(x)), a formula (with parameters) of the Stern formalism (cf. Lemma 2.10). As p ∈ G, G intersects D by Lemma 2.13, i.e. there is some a ∈ M such that ¬ϕ(a) ∈ Th(G). Then ϕ(a) / ∈ Th(G) by Lemma 2.14, so ϕ(a) / ∈ Th(M[G]) by induction. (1) and the forward direction of (2). The backward direction of (2) relies on Lemma 2.6 (4) for universal forcings: if p ϕ, there is q ≤ p such that q ¬ϕ. By Lemma 2.12 there is a generic G containing q. By the Truth Lemma
To see (3) just note that the set of ϕ satisfying the right hand side of (2) We have the following preservation result. Theorem 2.24. Let T be a universal L * -theory. If both (i) for every condition p, the theory T is consistent with G] ). Then ∆ ⊆ Th(G) by the Truth Lemma, that is, every literal λ ∈ ∆ is forced by some p λ ∈ G. Since G is consistent it contains a common extension p of all the p λ 's. Then ∆ ⊆ Lit(p) by Extension and T ∪ ∆ is consistent by (i).
Conservative forcing
Let be an existential or universal forcing. Which forcings produce generic expansions? We characterize these as follows. 
18). If it is not an isomorphism, then Th(M) and Th
(M[G]) disagree on some atomic L(M)-sentence. As Th(M[G]) = Th(G)
Some examples
Cohen forcing can be viewed as a natural special case: Example 2.27 (Cohen forcing). Cohen (set-) forcing starts with a countable transitive standard model M of, say, ZF+GCH and wants M[G] to be an extension of M. In particular L * = L = {∈}. Different forcing extensions are obtained by different choices of (P, ≤), a set in M, while the forcing Co is kept fixed. Following e.g. [28] one can define this forcing by universal forcing recurrence stipulating for atoms:
It is not hard to show that this uniquely determines a universal pre-forcing. The technicality of the definition is to ensure that it is a forcing. Genericity is defined to mean: intersect every dense set that is definable in M. This coincides with our notion for
In set theory one defines M[G] as follows: ∈ is interpreted by itself and the constants a ∈ M are interpreted by
Let M = (A, A ′ ) be a countable two-sorted structure where the two sorts A and A ′ carry dense linear orders without endpoints and
The forcing frame (P, ≤, D 0 , D 1 , . . .) is defined as follows: P is the set of all finite partial isomorphisms between A and A ′ ; take p ≤ q to mean p ⊇ q; finally the sets
Each of these sets is dense.
To define a conservative universal pre-forcing Ca it suffices to define p Ca ϕ for ϕ an atom of the form Rab. Take this to mean (a, b) ∈ p. Then Ca is a forcing: that Ca satisfies Extension for atoms is obvious. Since Ca is conservative we only have to verify Stability for atoms Raa ′ with a ∈ A, a 
. This and the fact that G intersects all the sets N that map n ∈ N to 0 or 1 whenever Rn ∈ p or ¬Rn ∈ p respectively. Now, instead of using these basic clopen sets as conditions, [18] use perfect sets in {0, 1}
N . Forcing frames considered in [18] are certain subframes of this forcing frame (cf. 
It is easy to see that these sets are dense.
For atomic ϕ we let p Ro ϕ if and only if T ∀ ∪ p ⊢ ϕ (slighty deviating from [19] ). This determines an existential pre-forcing Ro that is easily seen to be a forcing. By Theorem 2. . Their theory can be seen as a generalized model-companion for T . We refer to [19, 21] for more information and applications.
Notes
Forcing has been developed in many different settings ( [20, 3] survey some), and the development here follows these known lines. We refer to the examples in section 2.7 for a comparison with some of them.
Forcing against bounded arithmetic has been developed by Takeuti and Yasumoto [46, 47] following not Cohen's original method but its reformulation by Scott and Solovay [40] as a method to construct Boolean valued models (cf. Remark 2.8). Scott [40] describes such a model for a 3rd order theory of the reals by interpreting the language over real valued random variables.
Krajíček [26] develops such forcing with random variables in full detail as a method to study bounded arithmetics by using algorithmically restricted random variables.
Principal theorems
In set theory (Example 2.27) independence results are based on the "Principal Theorem" [43] stating that every generic extension M[G] of a countable model M of ZF again models ZF. In bounded arithmetic one is often interested in constructing generic expansions of a countable nonstandard model M of true arithmetic. One then needs the generic expansions to model some bounded arithmetic, i.e. certain least number principles.
In this section we fix -a countable forcing frame (P, ≤, D 0 , D 1 , . . .) -a conservative universal forcing , -an ordered countable L-structure M satisfying the least number principle (defined below).
-a countable language L * ⊃ L.
A model is ordered if it interprets the symbol < by some linear order on its universe. Given an ordered model N and b 0 ∈ N, the quantifiers ∀x < b 0 and ∃x < b 0 are called b 0 -bounded.
Remark 3.1. Due to conservativity, forcing recurrence works for bounded quantifiers as it does for unbounded quantifiers: (a) N satisfies the least number principle for Φ if every nonempty subset of its universe that is definable by a formula in Φ has a < N -least element.
(b) N satisfies the least number principle for Φ up to b 0 if it satisfies the least number principle for
We omit reference to Φ, if it is the set of all formulas in the language of N with parameters from N.
Partial definability
Recall the notation p ϕ from Example 2.7 and Remark 2.21.
(a) is definable for ϕ if for every p ∈ P the set {ā | p ϕ(ā)} is definable in M.
is densely definable for ϕ up to b 0 if for every p ∈ P there is q ≤ p such that {c
We say is (densely) definable (up to b 0 ) for a set Φ of L * (M)-formulas if is (densely) definable (up to b 0 ) for every ϕ ∈ Φ.
Although we are not going to use it, we include the following simple observation to illustrate the definition. is definable for Φ if and only if for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ and p ∈ P the set {c | p ϕ(c)} is definable in M.
2.
is densely definable for Φ up to b 0 if and only if for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ and p ∈ P there is q ≤ p such that {c In particular, if is definable for Φ, then every generic expansion of M satisfies the least number principle for Φ.
Proof. The second statement follows from the first noting that definability implies dense definability up to any b 0 ∈ M. To prove the first, let M[G] be a generic expansion of M and ϕ(x) ∈ Φ be such that M[G] |= ∃x < b 0 ϕ(x). We look for a least element in the set defined
Claim D ϕ is dense below every condition forcing ∃x < b 0 ϕ(x).
Proof of Claim Given p forcing ∃x < b 0 ϕ(x) we are looking for some
is dense below p, so for some b < M b 0 there is an extension q b ≤ p forcing ϕ(b). Dense definability applied to ϕ ∈ Φ and q b ∈ P gives someq ≤ q b such that
is definable in M. By Extensionq ϕ(b), soq ¬ϕ(b) by Consistency. Hence b ∈ C, so C = ∅. Because M satisfies the least number principle, C has a least element a ≤ M b < M b 0 . As a ∈ C we haveq ¬ϕ(a), so by forcing recurrence we find q a ≤q forcing ϕ(a). Then Here is a dual formulation of the Principal Theorem: Corollary 3.6. Let b 0 ∈ M and Φ be a set of L * (M)-formulas. If for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ and p ∈ P there is q ≤ p such that {c < M b 0 | q ϕ(c)} is definable in M, then every generic expansion of M satisfies transfinite induction for Φ up to b 0 , that is, for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ the sentence
Proof. The assumption implies that is densely definable for ¬Φ up to b 0 (see the proof of Proposition 3.4). Now observe that the least number principle for ¬Φ up to b 0 is equivalent to transfinite induction for Φ up to b 0 .
Remark 3.7. Assume P is definable in the sense that there is a first-order interpretation of (P, ≤) in M. If is definable for L * (M)-atoms, then an easy induction shows that is definable for all L * (M)-formulas; by the Principal Theorem then every generic expansion of M satisfies the least number principle.
Example 3.8. In set theory Cohen forcing (Example 2.27) or Easton forcing use definable forcing frames. In arithmetic, Feferman forcing (Example 2.29) uses definable forcing frames. This is due to the fact that it starts with the standard model. Simpson [44] gives an example of a definable forcing frame starting with a nonstandard model of arithmetic. In [22] Knight pads M with some additional sorts such that (P, ≤) becomes definable.
Lemma 3.9.
1. Let Ψ be the set of L * (M)-formulas ϕ such that is definable for ϕ. Then Ψ is closed under disjunctions and existential quantification. Proof. (1) and closure under disjunction in (2) follow easily from the recurrence in Example 2.7. We show closure under b 0 -bounded existential quantification in (2): let ϕ(yx) ∈ Ψ and p ∈ P . We are looking for q ≤ p such that {ā
is definable in M. By conservativity a < M b 0 is equivalent with s a < b 0 for any condition s. Hence the above set equals
and this is the set we want (see the recurrence in Example 2.7).
Definable antichains
We sketch a method to establish dense definability. We are going to apply it in the next section. The method is intended for the typical situation where P is an (in general undefinable) subset of M and there are L(M)-formulas ϕ(x, y), ψ(x, y) such that for all p, q ∈ P
In this case, the following two lemmas reduce dense definability of forcing to the definability of predense antichains refining given definable antichains.
We recall some standard forcing terminology: an antichain is a set of pairwise incompatible conditions. An antichain A is maximal in X ⊆ P if A ⊆ X and every p ∈ X is compatible with some element of A. A set X ⊆ P is predense (below p) if every condition (extending p) is compatible with some condition in X. E.g. an antichain is predense if and only if it is maximal in P . We write
The method is based on the simple observation that in order to define the forcing for some ϕ it suffices to define a maximal antichain in Proof. If p ϕ, then there is r ∈ [ϕ] extending p. Then r ∈ [ϕ] ↓ q since r ≤ p ≤ q. By maximality of X, r is compatible with some condition in X, and hence, as r ≤ p, so is p. The converse is immediate by Extension.
To find maximal antichains we intend to proceed by induction on ϕ. How to get, say, a maximal antichain in [¬ϕ] from a maximal antichain X in [ϕ]? This is easy if one finds a predense antichain A extending X -simply take A \ X. More generally, Lemma 3.11. Let A be a predense antichain and let Φ A be the set of
Proof. We only show (1) . Obviously A ∩ [ϕ] is an antichain in [ϕ] . To see maximality, note that any p ∈ [ϕ] is compatible with some condition in A by predensity, and since such a condition cannot be in [¬ϕ] (by Extension and Consistency), it must be in [ϕ].
Given some fixed antichain A, the previous lemma describes how to define the forcing for ϕ ∈ Φ A by induction on ϕ. The following, more versatile lemma describes how one can do when constructing suitable antichains on the way. What one needs in every step is a predense antichain that refines the current antichain in the following sense: Definition 3.12. For X, Y ⊆ P we say X refines Y if every condition in X that is compatible with some condition in Y already extends some condition in Y .
1. If X is a maximal antichain in [ϕ] ↓ p, and A ⊆ P ↓ p is an antichain that is predense below p and refines X, then A \ (A ↓ X) is a maximal antichain in [¬ϕ] ↓ p. 
3. If for every a < M b 0 , the set X a is a maximal antichain in [¬χ(a)] ↓ p, and A ⊆ P ↓ p is an antichain that is predense below p and refines
Proof. We only show (3). Obviously,
there are a 0 < M b 0 and r ≤ q such that r ¬χ(a 0 ) (Remark 3.1 and Lemma 2.6 (4)). By maximality of X a 0 , the condition r, and hence also q, is compatible with some condition in
To see that A ′ is maximal, let q ≤ p force ∀x < b 0 χ(x). Then q is compatible with some r ∈ A since A is predense below p. We claim r ∈ A ′ , i.e. r / ∈ A ↓ a< M b 0 X a . But otherwise r ¬χ(a 0 ) for some a 0 < M b 0 (by Extension) while q χ(a 0 ) (by Remark 3.1), so r and q would not be compatible (by Extension and Consistency).
Forcing against bounded arithmetic
In this section we fix -a countable language L containing {+, · , 0, 1, <}.
-a countable L-structure M that is a proper elementary extension of an L-expansion of (N, +, · , 0, 1, <).
-L * := L ∪ {R} for a new binary relation symbol R / ∈ L.
We shall use the following notation. For n ∈ M we write means that n ℓ < M m for every ℓ ∈ N.
Paris-Wilkie forcing
Let n ∈ M be nonstandard, i.e. such that [n] is infinite. We define a forcing frame (P, ≤ , D 0 , D 1 , . . .) as follows. Note that every (standard-)finite bijection from a subset of [n + 1] onto a subset of [n] is coded by an element in M. We let P be the set of all these codes. Note that P is not definable in M. As partial order we use p ≤ q if and only if p ⊇ q. Here, and below, we blur the distinction between p and the bijection coded. The family
. It is easy to see that these sets are dense.
To determine a universal pre-forcing PW it suffices to define p PW ϕ for atoms ϕ. We want a conservative forcing, so it suffices to define p PW ϕ for ϕ an L * (M)-atom that is not an L(M)-atom. Such an atom has the form Rst for closed L(M)-terms s, t. We set
It is straightforward to check that PW is a forcing and that M[G] is defined for every generic G (cf. Example 2.28).
Lemma 4.1. PW is definable for quantifier free L * (M)-formulas.
We prove this exemplifying the antichain method from section 3.2. However, a direct proof would be equally easy. We are in the "typical situation" that we have L(M)-formulas ϕ(x, y), ψ(x, y) such that for all p, q ∈ P (p ≤ q ⇐⇒ M |= ϕ(p, q)) and (p q ⇐⇒ M |= ψ(p, q)).
E.g. ψ(x, y) is a formula expressing that both x and y code partial bijections that agree on arguments on which they are both defined.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let ϕ = ϕ(x) be a quantifier free L * (M)-formula. Forc from M let T (c) be the set of those a ∈ M that are denoted by some closed term in ϕ(c). Further, let Ac be the set of all minimal partial bijections p such that dom(p) contains T (c)∩[n+1] and im(p) contains T (c) ∩ [n]. As T (c) is finite, Ac ⊆ P , and it is easily seen to be a predense antichain. We use Lemma 3.11: observe the set Φ Ac defined there contains all atomic subsentences of ϕ(c) and is closed under Boolean combinations.
First write an L(M)-formula α(z,x) such that α(z,c) defines Ac (in M). Then, for every atomic subformula ψ(x) of ϕ(x), write a formulaψ(z,x) such thatψ(z,c) defines Ac ∩ [ψ(c)]. This is a maximal antichain in [ψ(c)] by Lemma 3.11. Using the recurrence of this lemma, one can find such a formula for every Boolean combination of such ψ(x)s, and in particular for ϕ(x). Lemma 3.10 (for q = ∅) then implies that PW is definable for ϕ(x). 
Theorem 4.2 (Paris, Wilkie 1985). Let
n ∈ M be nonstandard. Then M has an L * - expansion (M, R M ) such that R M is a bijection from [n + 1] onto [n] and (M, R M ) satisfies the least number principle for existential L * (M)-formulas.
Riis forcing
In this section, we assume that L also contains a function symbol − for subtraction (cut off at 0) and some function symbols lh(x) and (x) y for sequence coding such that in the "standard" model every finite sequence is of the form ((n) 0 , . . . , (n) lh(n)−1 ) for some n ∈ N. We define the forcing. Note that every small relation is bounded in M because this holds in the standard model for any choice of standard b 0 . In particular, every small bijection from a subset of M onto a subset of [n] is L(M)-definable and bounded in M, and hence coded by an element of M. Let P ⊆ M be the set of all these codes. Again we set p ≤ q if p ⊇ q, and let D 0 , D 1 , . . . enumerate the sets {p | a ∈ dom(p)}, {p | c ∈ im(p)} for a ∈ M, c ∈ [n]. These sets are dense: note that both the domain and range of p ∈ P are small; but neither M nor [n] are small (by the assumption that
The forcing relation is defined as in the previous section:
This determines a conservative universal pre-forcing, and in fact a forcing (cf. Example 2.28). 
To see this, assume M[G] |= ∀x < b 0 ∃y ϕ(x, y) and consider the formula 
Ajtai forcing
We prove Ajtai's result [1] including its improvements from [27, 31] . Compared to Theorem 4.3 it embodies an exponential improvement concerning the bound b 0 , namely, it assumes We now define the forcing frame P . It is going to be an undefinable subframe of the definable frame P (n). The set {p ∈ P (n) | p < M n − n ǫ } is definable in M for every standard rational 0 < ǫ < 1. We let P be the union of all these sets. As usual p ≤ q means p ⊇ q, and the family D 0 , D 1 , . . . enumerates the sets {p ∈ P | b ∈ dom(p)} and {p ∈ P | c ∈ im(p)} for b ∈ [n + 1], c ∈ [n]. It is easy to see that these sets are dense (in P ).
We define the forcing as in the previous two sections: we let p ∈ P force an atom Rst if (s M , t M ) ∈ p and denote by Aj the resulting conservative universal pre-forcing. It is easy to see that Aj is a forcing and that M[G] is defined for every generic G (cf. Example 2.28). 
Note the sequence (Aā
Then (Bā)ā < M b 0 is in M and has rank at most s + |b 0 |/c by (f ).
We show that conjunctions of good formulas are good. Let ϕ(x) and ψ(ȳ) be good, c ∈ N positive and p ∈ P . We can assume thatx equalsȳ. As seen, ¬ϕ(x) is good, so there arẽ r ∈ P,r ≤ p, and maximal antichainsXā in [¬ϕ(ā)] ↓r of rank at most r + |b 0 |/(2c). Since also ¬ψ(x) is good, there are r ∈ P, r ≤r, and maximal antichains 
is a maximal antichain in [(ϕ ∧ ψ)(ā)] ↓ s; it has rank ≤ M s + |b 0 |/c by (f ). Finally, we show that the set of good formulas is closed under b 0 -bounded universal quantification. Let ϕ(xx) be good, c ∈ N positive and p ∈ P . Then ¬ϕ(xx) is good, so there are r ∈ P, r ≤ p, and maximal antichains X aā in [¬ϕ(aā)] ↓ r of rank at most r + |b 0 |/(2c). Applying the Switching Lemma on the sequence (
Similarly as before, (f ) and Lemmas 4.12 and 3.13 (3) imply that
Notes
Compared to Riis' original argument [38] 1 (R). Compared with other proofs of Theorem 4.7, roughly, the predense antichains in our argument correspond to the complete systems in [27] and [51] , to branches in shallow decision trees in [50, 26] or to the small covers in [1] . Our exposition is close to [23, Section 12.3] .
Forcing type arguments for Ajtai's result have been given in [1, 51] and [23, section 12.7 ] and more recently in [26] . In [23, section 12.7] Krajíček presents the method of k-evaluations of propositional formulas [27] as a forcing type argument. Our proof constructs for certain ϕ a predense antichain together with its maximal part in [ϕ] . These pairs of sets give a modified notion of |b 0 |-evaluation. As in Zambella [51] , our argument sidesteps a detour through propositional logic like in [1, 27, 50, 23] . It is simpler than Zambella's in that it avoids the restriction to "internal" generics [51] .
All known arguments for Ajtai's result, including Krajíček's more recent proof in [26] , use the Switching Lemma in one or another form. The main obstacle to generalize Ajtai's argument to other principles is the difficulty to find analogues of this lemma. According to the proof presented here, its role in the argument is to provide the existence of refining antichains, a combinatorial property of the forcing frame. The rest of the argument is taken over by the general machinery, i.e. the Principal Theorem and the antichain method.
Forcing and propositional logic
The spectrum of a sentence ϕ 0 is the set of naturals m ≥ 1 such that ϕ 0 has a model of size m. Given m ≥ 1, there is a propositional formula ϕ 0 m whose satisfying assignments describe size m models of ϕ 0 . If ϕ 0 has empty spectrum, all of these formulas are unsatisfiable, and one may ask for short or otherwise simple propositional refutations. If such a sentence also does not have infinite models, short refutations exist even in treelike resolution [39] , but in the presence of an infinite model things are hard to understand [39, 25, 15] . We refer to [16] for a survey on the complexity of first-order spectra.
Propositional translation
Let L 0 be a finite language and ϕ 0 be an L 0 -sentence of the form
where J is a finite nonempty set,x = x 0 , . . . , x k−1 and the C j 's are clauses. We assume further that ϕ 0 is unnested, that is, its atoms have the form y = z or Eȳ or fȳ = z for E, f ∈ L 0 . Remark 5.1. Skolemization allows to compute from a given sentence one of the specified form with the same spectrum. Moreover, the computed sentence has an infinite model if and only if the given sentence has one.
We write propositional formulas in de Morgan language {∧, ∨, ¬} using propositional constants ⊤ and ⊥ for "true" and "false" respectively and propositional atoms of the form 
For m ≥ 1 the translation PHP m := ϕ 0 m contains the functionality clauses plus (¬f ac ∨ ¬f bc), (¬f ac ∨ ¬gc) for a, b, c ∈ [m], a = b; here, we omit ⊥ from clauses and clauses containing ⊤. This is a version of the functional, injective, m to m − 1 pigeonhole principle (cf. [37] for a survey).
An application of Riis' Theorem
Fix an unnested L 0 -sentence ϕ 0 = ∀x j∈J C j (x) with empty spectrum and an infinite model. We aim to show that every semantic refutation of ϕ 0 m contains a "complex" formula.
A semantic refutation of ϕ 0 m is a sequence of propositional formulas in the atoms of ϕ 0 m that ends in ⊥ and every formula is either a clause in ϕ 0 m or logically implied by two previous formulas.
Our complexity measure for propositional formulas is the height of a Poizat tree computing the formula. This is a full m-branching ordered tree whose inner nodes are labeled with
r , where E and f are r-ary relation and function symbols from L 0 respectively; its leafs are labeled with truth values 0, 1. Moreover, no label occurs twice on some path.
Every path in such a tree corresponds in a natural way to a partial functional assignment: if it contains a node labeled (E,ā) and its (i + 1)th successor, the propositional atom Eā evaluates to 0 or 1 depending on whether i = 0 or not; if it contains a node labeled (f,ā) and its (i + 1)th successor, every propositional atom fāb is evaluated to 1 or 0 depending on whether b = i or not. Two paths (in possibly different trees) are compatible if there exists a functional assignment containing the two partial assignments corresponding to the paths; two leafs (in possibly different trees) are compatible if so are the paths leading to them.
Conversely, every functional assignment determines a branch of a given Poizat tree. The tree computes a given propositional formula if for every functional assignment A the truth value of the formula under A coincides with the label of the leaf on the branch determined by A.
Definition 5.3. The Poizat width of a formula is the minimal height of a Poizat tree computing it.
The Poizat width of a formula is well-defined: a formula with ℓ atoms has Poizat width at most ℓ, since it can be computed by the trivial tree that queries all appearing atoms one after another. In particular, the clauses in ϕ 0 m have constant Poizat width (i.e. independent of m). Note that a functionality clause is computed by the one-node tree with label 1, so has Poizat width 0. Proof. Choose for every m ≥ 1 a semantic refutation of ϕ 0 m of minimal Poizat width h(m) (the Poizat width of a sequence of formulas is understood as the maximal Poizat width of a formula in the sequence). To extend this sequence of refutations to the pseudo-finite we need to code it in arithmetic. We can keep this technically simple using a suitably rich language L. View the nodes of an m-branching tree as a set of (codes of) sequences over [m] that is closed under initial segments. To talk about them we use function symbols lh(x), (x) z and (x) <z for the length, the (z +1)th component and the length z initial segment of the sequence x; we further use a symbol x − y for subtraction (cf. section 4.2). Using a symbol (x, y) for pairing and identifying E, f, . . . ∈ L 0 with numbersĖ,ḟ , . . . ∈ N queries (Ė,ā), (ḟ ,ā) become naturals; we assume these to be bigger than 2. To code the refutations we use a ternary function symbol π such that the function π(m, i, ·) coincides with the labeling of the Poizat tree of the (i + 1)th formula in the refutation of ϕ 0 m ; on arguments not coding nodes of the tree, the function has value 2. Note that the formula π(m, i, x) < 2 defines the set of leaves in the tree for the (i + 1)th formula of the mth refutation. Additionally, we add unary function symbols lines and h such that lines(m) and h(m) are the length and the Poizat width of the mth refutation.
Further, we let L contain the language L 0 and interpret it over N such that it models ϕ 0 . Let M be a countable L-model that is a proper elementary extension of the 'standard' L-model N. In particular, M |= ϕ 0 .
Assume the theorem fails. Then there is, for every ℓ, an m ≥ ℓ such that h(m)+1 < m 1/ℓ . Apply this to a nonstandard ℓ ∈ M, and find nonstandard n, b 0 ∈ M such that h M (n) < M ) does not code the 'fictitious' assignment that describes this structure. We show, however, that every tree π M (n, i, ·) contains a leaf corresponding to this 'fictitious' assignment. Such a leaf is obtained from a sequence c of length h M (n) + 1 ≤ M b 0 that answers all queries according to the 'fictitious' assignment and, say, stays constant upon reaching a point with a Boolean label.
Formally, this means that ∀z < lh(c) ψ(n, i, c, z) holds in (M, R M ) for a suitable formula ψ. E.g. if L 0 = {E, f } for a unary relation symbol E and a unary function symbol f , the formula ψ(n, i, c, z) reads If c codes such a sequence of length at least h M (n) + 1, then (c) <ℓ is a leaf for the minimal ℓ such that π M (n, i, (c) <ℓ ) < M 2.
Claim For every i < M lines M (n), (M, R M ) satisfies ∃x (π(n, i, x) < 2 ∧ ∀z < lh(x) ψ(n, i, x, z)).
Proof of Claim As argued above, it suffices to show the existence of a suitable sequence, i.e. it suffices to show the claim with π(n, i, x) < 2 replaced by lh(x) = h(n) + 1. To this end consider the formula χ(u) obtained replacing π(n, i, x) < 2 by lh(x) = h(n) + 1 − u. k ) there is a trivial tree Tā j querying all appearing atoms one after another; if h j ∈ N denotes the number of these atoms, then any branch in Tā j makes h j many queries each having the form (E,ā ′ ), (f,ā ′ ) with the components ofā ′ appearing among those ofā.
We can assume that π N (m, i, ·) equals Tā j when the (i+1)th formula is C j (ā) m , and that π N (m, i, ·) equals the one-node tree with label 1 when the (i + 1)th formula is a functionality clause. Otherwise there are i ′ , i ′′ < i such that the following soundness condition holds:
if ℓ is a leaf of π N (m, i, ·) labeled 0 and ℓ ′ , ℓ ′′ are leafs of π N (m, i ′ , ·) and π N (m, i ′′ , ·) such that ℓ, ℓ ′ , ℓ ′′ are pairwise compatible, then at least one of ℓ ′ , ℓ ′′ is labeled 0.
Observe that compatibility can be expressed by an L-formula. By elementary equivalence then, the soundness condition holds in M for the (nonstandard) trees π M (n, i, ·). Now consider the formula "the line y is false":
∃x (π(n, y, x) = 0 ∧ ∀z < lh(x) ψ(n, y, x, z)). γ X ∈ M, then β satisfies True(x) if and only if α is satisfied by the assignment mapping X to the truth value of True(γ X ).
Thus, if α 0 ,...,α r−1 αr is a rule in F and β i ∈ M are obtained from α i via some substitution and β r satisfies ¬True(x), then there is i < r such that β i satisfies ¬True(x) (in particular, r = 0). Then ¬True((π) y ) is a ∆ b 0 0 (R)-formula that defines a set containing lh(π) − 1 < M b 0 but no minimum, a contradiction.
Notes
Width lower bounds on resolution refutations follow from certain 'expansion' properties of sets of clauses [8] , and are characterized by the existence of winning strategies for the adversary in a prover-adversary game [35, 2] . For a different notion of width, Dantchev and Riis [15] established a general width lower bound on treelike R(k) refutations of principles of the form ϕ 0 m . Segerlind et al. [42] transfered width lower bounds for resolution in the sense of [8] , to width lower bounds for daglike R(k) -this time in the sense of having small height decision trees. This argument uses special properties of R(k). Poizat trees are called as they are because queries correspond to basic operations of machines in the sense of [32] .
